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TYPE OF LEASE FOR AN S CORPORATION
— by Neil E. Harl*
Since enactment of the S corporation concept in 1958, it
has been important to give careful thought to the kind of
lease entered into by S corporations as landowners.1  In the
years since the major amendments to Subchapter S of the
Internal Revenue Code in 1982,2  The type of lease has been
less important for some S corporations but it is still a major
checklist item for S corporation planning.
The rule through 1982.  Under the rules applicable
through 1982, the S corporation election terminated if more
than 20 percent of the corporation's gross receipts came from
rents, royalties, dividends, interest, annuities and sales or
exchanges of stock or securities.3  The term rent, however,
did not include payments for the use or occupancy of property
where significant services were rendered.4  In a farm context,
the Internal Revenue Service had ruled that income of farm
corporations owning and leasing farms to tenants under a
crop-share or livestock share lease was not "rental" income if
the corporate officers or agents participated to a material
degree in production through physical work, management
decisions or both.5  The Tax Court agreed with that posi-
tion.6  The purported assignment of rents to another organiza-
tion was ineffective in avoiding application of the 20 percent
rule.7
Rules applicable after 1982 .  Under the 1982
amendments, the limit on passive investment income is
eliminated for corporations that do not have accumulated
earnings and profits from years the corporation was regularly
taxed.8
For corporations with accumulated earnings and profits
from years in which the corporation was regularly taxed, a tax
is imposed at the highest rate for corporate income on the
passive investment income in excess of 25 percent of gross
receipts.9  Note that the tax is not  imposed because of earn-
ings and profits accrued while the corporation was taxed as an
S corporation.  A Subchapter S election terminates if a cor-
poration under a Subchapter S election has earnings and
profits at the close of each of three consecutive taxable years
from years the corporation was under regularly taxed or Sub-
chapter C status and more than 25 percent of gross receipts
from each of the taxable years comes from passive invest-
ment income.10   If steps are taken immediately to pay net
earnings and profits as a dividend, the termination of S corpo-
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ration status may be considered inadvertent.11  For inadvertent
terminations, IRS is authorized to waive the effects of the
termination if the corporation acts in a timely fashion to cor-
rect the problem and if the corporation and the shareholders
agree to be treated as though the election had been in effect
for the period involved.12
The rules applicable since 1982 mean that newly formed
S corporations and existing S corporations with no earnings
and profits need not worry about the passive income limita-
tion.  As was the case before 1983,13 income under a crop
share or livestock share lease with material participation is
not considered to be passive income.14  Thus, careful atten-
tion as to type of lease is suggested for S corporations with
earnings and profits from years the corporation was regularly
taxed.  If assets are leased, those corporation should be careful
to use a crop share or livestock share lease with material par-
ticipation demonstrated under the lease.  The corporation
should designate someone to be involved in meeting the
material participation requirement with the corporate records,
including the minutes, reflecting the necessary involvement
under the lease.
An important point to note is that if a corporation's Sub-
chapter S election terminates because the passive income
limit is not met, the election terminates for the entire taxable
year.15
FOOTNOTES
1 See generally 7 Harl, Agricultural Law § 56.06[4] (1990).
2 Pub.L. 97-354, 96 Stat. 1669 (1982).
3 I.R.C. § 1372(e)(5).  McIlhinney v. Comm'r, T.C. Memo.
1979-473 (election terminated even though taxpayer had
loss); Masters v. U.S., 80-1 U.S.Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 9376 (E.D.
Wis. 1980) (farm corporation received "rent").
4 See, e.g., City Markets, Inc. v Comm'r, 433 F.2d 1240 (6th
Cir. 1970).
5 Rev. Rul. 61-112, 1961-1 C.B. 399.
6 See Kennedy v. Comm'r, T.C. Memo. 1974-149 (nonsalaried
president of corporation was also tenant under crop-share
lease; held, passive investment income since corporation was
not actively involved in activity).
7 Johnston v. Comm'r, T.C. Memo. 1976-142.
8 I.R.C. § 1362(d)(3).
9 I.R.C. § 1375(a).
1 0 I.R.C. § 1362(d)(3)(A).
1 1 See Ltr. Rul. 9026011, March 22, 1990 (election terminated
because passive investment income exceeded 25 percent of
gross receipts for three consecutive years; steps taken
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immediately to pay out earnings and profits as dividend so
termination inadvertent).
1 2 I.R.C. § 1362(f).
1 3 See note 5 supra and accompanying text.
1 4 Ltr. Rul. 9003056, Oct. 26, 1989.
1 5 I.R.C. § 1362(d)(3)(A)(ii).
CASES, REGULATIONS AND STATUTES
BANKRUPTCY
  GENERAL  
ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENSES.  The debtor leased
grain and manure storage equipment and continued to possess
and use the equipment during the bankruptcy case.  Two of
the leases were in default prior to the bankruptcy filing and
all three leases terminated by their terms after the filing.  The
debtor did not assume the leases and agreed to return the
equipment to the lessor.  The court held that although the
debtor did not make full use of the equipment during the
debtor's post-petition possession, the lessor was entitled to
an administrative expense claim for the fair rental value of
the equipment while the debtor possessed it post-petition.
Matter of Thayn Farms, Inc., 117 B.R. 5 1 2 0
(Bankr. D. Neb. 1988).
AVOIDABLE LIENS.  The Chapter 7 farm debtors
claimed a disc, planter and tractor as exempt under the federal
tools of the trade and wild card exemptions in Section 522(d).
The debtors also sought to avoid liens against the equipment
to the extent of the exemptions.  The court held that large
farm machinery such as the equipment here are eligible for
the tools of the trade exemption for farm debtors.  In re
Sugarek, 117 B.R. 271 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1990).
EXEMPTIONS.  The debtor owned an interest in a state
mandated retirement account which was accumulated while
the debtor was a public school teacher.  On the date the peti-
tion was filed, the debtor was no longer employed as a
teacher and had the right to withdraw amounts the debtor had
contributed to the account.  The court held that the state
retirement account was a spendthrift trust under Iowa law and
excludible from the debtor's estate except that because the
debtor's employment had terminated and the debtor could
withdraw funds from the account, the account was no longer
a spendthrift trust and was included in the debtor's estate.
The court also held that the debtor's interest in the account
which could be withdrawn was exempt under the special
exemption provided in the law creating the retirement
account, Iowa Code Chapter 97B.  Matter of Carver,
116 B.R. 985 (Bankr. S.D. Iowa 1990).
The debtor lived in Iowa and owned an interest in a
Nebraska city employee retirement account which prohibited
assignment or attachment.  The debtor could not make any
withdrawals from the account before termination of employ-
ment or retirement, and at the date of the bankruptcy peti-
tion, the debtor was still employed with the city.  The court
held that the retirement account was a spendthrift trust under
Nebraska law and excluded from the debtor's bankruptcy
estate.  The court provided an alternative analysis that if the
account was includible in the estate, the debtor would not be
entitled to an exemption under Iowa Code 627.6(8)(e),
because the amount in the account was not reasonably neces-
sary for the support of the debtor.  Matter of Layton,
116 B.R. 995 (Bankr. S.D. Iowa 1990).
The debtor lived in Iowa and owned an interest in a
Nebraska state employee retirement account which was
exempt from taxes, execution and attachment and which
prohibited assignment.  The debtor could not make any with-
drawals from the account before termination of employment
or retirement, and at the time of the petition, the debtor was
still employed.  The court held that the retirement account
was a spendthrift trust under Nebraska law and excluded from
the debtor's bankruptcy estate.  The court provided an alterna-
tive analysis that if the account was includible in the estate,
the Iowa exemption for interests in retirement accounts was
not preempted by ERISA.  The court found insufficient
evidence on the record to determine whether the account was
necessary for the support of the debtor.  Matter o f
Gouker, 116 B.R. 1005 (Bankr. S.D. Iowa 1990).
The debtor owned an interest in an employer funded
ESOP which was qualified under ERISA.  The debtor was
prohibited from assigning her interest in the plan and could
not make withdrawals until termination of employment or
retirement, and at the time of the petition, the debtor was
still employed.  The court held that the ESOP was a
spendthrift trust under Iowa law and excluded from the
bankruptcy estate.  The court provided an alternative analysis
that the Iowa exemption for the plan was not preempted by
ERISA but that the debtor's interest in the plan would not be
exempt because it was not necessary for the support of the
debtor.  Matter of Bartlett, 116 B.R. 1015 (Bankr.
S.D. Iowa 1990).
The debtor claimed a homestead exemption in a rural
home and farmland acquired by will from a parent.  At the
time of the petition, however, the debtor and family lived in
an urban home several miles from the claimed homestead.
Although the debtor farmed the land, the debtor never lived in
the claimed homestead but only filed a statement of intended
homestead prior to filing bankruptcy.  The court denied the
homestead exemption and found that the urban residence was
the debtor's homestead for exemption purposes because the
debtor did not take any overt actions which established
homestead qualities on the claimed homestead or established
abandonment of the old residence.  In re  Bohac, 1 1 7
B.R. 256 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1990).
The debtor owned an interest in an employee annuity plan
provided by the employer and claimed the interest as an
exempt annuity under Ohio Rev. Code §§ 2329.66(A)(6)(b),
3911.10.  The court held that the debtor's interest in the
annuity was not eligible for the exemption because payment
of the annuity did not depend upon the death of the debtor but
was a pension savings plan based upon employment.  In re
Cullison, 117 B.R. 314 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio
1990) .
